Granular Institutional Investors and Global Market Interdependence by Jinjarak, Yothin & Zheng, Huanhuan
Journal of International Money and Finance 46 (2014) 61–81Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of International Money
and Finance
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ j imfGranular institutional investors and global
market interdependenceq
Yothin Jinjarak a,d, Huanhuan Zheng b,c,*
aUniversity of London, Financial and Management Studies, United Kingdom
b The University of York, Department of Economics and Related Studies, York, United Kingdom
c The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Institute of Global Economics and Finance, Hong Kong
dADB Institute, Tokyo, JapanJEL classiﬁcation:
E44
F3
G15
Keywords:
Systemic risk
Risk propagation
Market interdependence
Financial crisisq We are thankful for comments from Ciaran Driv
Royal Economic Society, The Kiel Institute for the W
and Peking University HSBC Business School. Huan
of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
* Corresponding author. The University of York,
E-mail addresses: yj5@soas.ac.uk (Y. Jinjarak), H
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonﬁn.2014.03.007
0261-5606/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserveda b s t r a c t
We study the propagation of global investment risk across markets
through the granular view of institutional investors. Applying the
conditional value-at-risk estimation to micro-level weekly obser-
vations of international mutual funds between 2003 and 2011, we
ﬁnd that idiosyncratic shocks to large institutional investors
explain both aggregate market risk and cross-market risk inter-
dependence. Conditional on the US capital markets being in
ﬁnancial distress, idiosyncratic shocks to the top 10% largest funds
investing in the US explain about 40% of the risk ﬂuctuations in
other non-US markets. The ﬁndings are also economically and
statistically signiﬁcant for the top largest funds investing in non-
US markets, with the effects becoming especially large during
the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09. These results are robust after
controlling for common risk factors and applying alternative
measures of idiosyncratic shocks.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The recent global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted exceptional magnitude of global
interdependence across ﬁnancial markets. The market linkages seem particularly pronounced whener, Sushanta Mallick, Christine Oughton, the 2012 Annual Conference of the
orld Economy, SOAS, Queen Mary, University of London, University of York,
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the S&P 500 lost 4.7% of its value, and the market tumble immediately spread to most major ﬁnancial
markets, with the MSCI world index dropped by 3.6% on that day. Yet, while there is garden-variety
anecdotal evidence about the role of idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁnancial institutions, empirical
studies on how they account for the global ﬁnancial market interdependence remain scarce and largely
inconclusive.
Built upon the granular view of Gabaix (2011) and the CoVaR (conditional value-at-risk) method-
ology of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), this paper sheds new light on the association between
idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁnancial institutions, ‘the granular institutional investors’, and global
market interdependence as well as market aggregate risk. Gabaix’s granular view suggests that the
idiosyncratic micro-level shocks are not cancelled out at the aggregate level; instead, they have the
potential to generate nontrivial aggregate shocks, and via general equilibrium, all market players.1 See
2 It is
trouble
transm
ﬁnancia“. many economic ﬂuctuations are not, primitively, due to small diffuse shocks that directly
affect every ﬁrm. Instead, many economic ﬂuctuations are attributable to the incompressible
“grains” of economic activity, the large ﬁrms.. call this view the “granular” hypothesis. In the
granular view, idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁrms have the potential to generate nontrivial
aggregate shocks that affect GDP, and via general equilibrium, all ﬁrms.”
(Gabaix, 2011: 734–735).Gabaix ﬁnds that a third of variations in the US output growth is dependent signiﬁcantly on the
performance of the largest 100 ﬁrms, thereby providing some smoking-gun evidence of this granular
hypothesis. Through the lens of this granular view transposed onto the ﬁnancial market, we are
interested in whether idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁnancial institutions provide information on the
aggregatemarket risk and the cross-market risk interdependence. If the granular view holds broadly in
the ﬁnancial market, we expect the micro-level shocks to explain an important fraction of the overall
market risk ﬂuctuations. Moreover, as the idiosyncratic shocks to big institutions could generate not
only nontrivial aggregate shocks in a single market but also additional impacts on other institutions
across borders, we also expect the shocks to contribute to the variations in the global market risk co-
movements.
As the granular view motivates our study with respect to the role of idiosyncratic shocks to large
ﬁnancial institutions, the CoVaR methodology provides a foundation to estimate the cross market
interdependence in a simple and efﬁcient way for the objective of our empirical exercise. Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) apply CoVaR to measure the systemic risk contribution of individual ﬁnancial
institutions. Several studies extend this CoVaR method and its related versions to investigate different
aspects of interdependence in the ﬁnancial market.1We contribute to this strand of literature and apply
CoVaR, essentially the value at risk of one ﬁnancial market conditional on another ﬁnancial market
being in distress, to measure the magnitude of global market interdependence. The CoVaR measure
incorporates the risk driven by the market-speciﬁc characteristics, risk transmitted from another
market as well common factors that affect all ﬁnancial markets alike. This empirical approach enables
us to estimate the aggregate market interdependence efﬁciently and is especially useful in accounting
for potential channels through which the idiosyncratic shocks may inﬂuence the global market
interdependence.2
Using a weekly micro-level dataset on international mutual funds, we ﬁnd that an economically
signiﬁcant fraction of the cross-market risk interdependence is explained by the idiosyncratic shocks to
large institutional investors. In particular, idiosyncratic shocks to the top 10% largest funds investing in
the US account for about 40% of the variations in the non-US market’s risk conditional on the US being
in distress. Our results suggest that 13% of the variance of global market interdependence can beEngle and Manganelli (2004), Adams et al. (2010), Wong and Fong (2011), and Gauthier et al. (2010).
true that we may apply CoVaR to calculate the aggregate market risk conditional on a big ﬁnancial institution being in
to gauge the importance of the institution. However, such a CoVaR measure cannot differentiate whether the risk
itted from a speciﬁc ﬁnancial institution originates from its idiosyncratic shock or common factors that affect both the
l institution and the whole market. That is why we complement it with the granular approach by Gabaix (2011).
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institutional investors, increase the explanatory power to 28%. Further, the granular residuals account
for 20% of the ﬂuctuations in the aggregate market risk. These results suggest that useful information
can be extracted from examining the idiosyncratic shocks to large institutional investors.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst is about the systematic importance of
individual ﬁnancial institution. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) document that bigger institutions
post greater risk on the ﬁnancial system using a sample of commercial banks, broker dealers, in-
surance companies, and real estate companies in the US. Similar evidence is found in the context of
international mutual funds by Jinjarak and Zheng (2012) and in the banking sector of Asia and the
Paciﬁc by Huang et al. (2012). López-Espinosa et al. (2012), in contrast, ﬁnd little relevance in the
relationship between bank size and systemic risk. However, none of these studies differentiate
whether the risk transmitted from a speciﬁc ﬁnancial institution originates from its idiosyncratic
shocks or common factors that affect that ﬁnancial institution and the whole market. The granular
residual of Gabaix (2011) differentiates the idiosyncratic shocks to large institutions. In the context of
ﬁnancial markets, the granular residuals can be used to test the granular hypothesis whether idio-
syncratic shocks to large ﬁnancial institution have any impact on the aggregate ﬂuctuations. Existing
empirical studies test the granular hypothesis within country; for example, Giovanni and Levchenko
(2011) ﬁnd evidence in support of the granular hypothesis for trade in each of the 50 largest econ-
omies in the world; Blank et al. (2009) provide similar evidence in the German banking system; and
Buch and Neugebauer (2011) document that in 35 European countries, idiosyncratic shocks to loan
growth at large banks have a signiﬁcant short-run impact on GDP growth. Our paper tests the
granular hypothesis in a broader ﬁnancial market context and tries to establish the relationship
between the idiosyncratic shocks to granular institutional investors and the global market
interdependence.
Theoretically, the granular view holds as long as the size of the institutional investors follows a
power law distribution with an exponent close to 1 (Gabaix, 2011). Idiosyncratic shocks that cannot
be averaged out at country level may spill over to the regional/global market as long as the condition on
size distribution holds. Nonetheless the idiosyncratic shocks to large institutional investors in one
market, even trivial ones at the global aggregate, may affect the cross-market interdependence: they
could change the dynamic interaction between two relatedmarkets through their impact on aggregate
risk ﬂuctuations of the market they invest in, and the shocks may cause other investors to update their
information and investment styles, which in turn transmit the shocks to other institutions, even if they
have no direct linkage to the institutions facing initial shocks (Giesecke, 2004; Collin-Dufresne et al.,
2010).
The second strand of literature is on the international market interdependence via equity in-
vestment, the institutional investors’ role in ﬁnancial intermediation and the transmission mecha-
nism of liquidity shocks throughout the global capital markets. The premise of this literature is the
competitive interaction among investors worldwide and its associated market inefﬁciency that
potentially leads to externalities and spillovers in the ﬁnancial markets (Stein, 2009). Given the
market inefﬁciency, the distress of one market may inadvertently depress the others. Jotikasthira
et al. (2012) ﬁnd in a sample of international mutual funds that funding-driven ﬁre sales of mutual
funds domiciled in developed markets signiﬁcantly affect their asset holdings in emerging markets,
thereby increasing the sensitivity of overall emerging-market returns to developed-market returns.
Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) document that country exposures of mutual funds change pro-
cyclically: investment weights are reduced in countries faced with ﬁnancial crisis and increased in
countries with improved conditions. This active portfolio rebalancing during the crisis helps prop-
agate shocks across markets.3 Our empirical framework identiﬁes an additional of global market
interdependence based on the CoVaRmeasure, complementing earlier works, i.e. Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), Longin and Solnik (2001), Bekaert et al. (2012), on explaining the cross-border correlation of
portfolio investments.3 See also Broner et al. (2006), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Claessens and Forbes (2001), Froot et al. (2001), Gelos (2011) and
Jinjarak et al. (2011).
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2.1. Static measures of conditional risk
Let Ri be the investment return variable of region i, and VaRi be the 1% Value at Risk (VaR) that
measures the tail risk of investment in region i. The risk of investment in region j conditional on region i
being in market distress is denoted as CoVaRjji, for j s i. To estimate CoVaRjji, we follow Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) by estimating a 1% quantile regression of region j’s return Rj on region i’s return Ri:
Rj;t ¼ ajji þ bjjiRi;t þ ejji;t : (1)
When region i is in distress, we have Ri ¼ VaRi, where VaRi is the 1% quantile of Ri, which measures
the unconditional risk of region i. Unlike the OLS method that estimates the coefﬁcients by minimizing
the sum of the squared residuals, the 1% quantile regression ﬁnds the solution by minimizing the sum
of the absolute residuals in the following equation (Koenker and Bassett, 1978):
min
ajji ;bjji
2
4 X
t˛ftjRj;tajjiþbjjiRi;tg
1%
Rj;t  ajji  bjjiRi;t
þ X
t˛ftjRj;t<ajjiþbjjiRi;tg
99%
Rj;t  ajji  bjjiRi;t

3
5:
Note that in the quantile regression, the coefﬁcients estimated from the regression of Rj,t on Ri,t is
different from those based on the regression of Ri,t on Rj,t. This property enables us to document any
asymmetric interdependence for each pair of region (i,j).
To capture the risk linkage between regions j and i, we apply the conditional risk measure CoVaRjji,
where a negative value of the conditional risk CoVaRjji equals the ﬁtted value of the following 1%
quantile regression conditional on Ri ¼ VaRi:
CoVaRjji ¼ bajji  bbjjiVaRi; CoVaRjji > VaRj;
where bajji and bbjji are coefﬁcients estimated from Eq. (1). Higher value of CoVaRjji suggests higher
investment risk of region j conditional on region i being in market distress. If CoVaRjji > VaRj, the
conditional risk of region j is higher than the unconditional risk, suggesting accordingly that the in-
vestment risk of region i increases the risk of region j.
2.2. Time-varying measures of conditional risk
While static CoVaR is efﬁcient in summarizing the overall market interdependence, they ignore the
dynamics of these conditional risk measures. To capture the time variations in the joint distribution of
multiple returns, i.e Ri and Rj, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) by estimating the conditional
distribution as a function of a vector of lagged state variables Mt1:
Ri;t ¼ ai þ giMt1 þ 3i; (2)
Rj;t ¼ ajji þ bjjiRi;t þ gjjiMt1 þ 3jji; (3)
where Mt1 includes the simple return of the MSCI World Index (RMSCI_Global), the gap between the 3-
month and overnight London Interbank Offered Rate or LIBOR (LIBOR3m-o/n), the difference between
the overnight LIBOR and the federal funds target rate (LIBORo/n FFTarget), the difference between the
Chicago Board of Trade’s (CBOT) federal funds futures rate and the 3-month treasury rate
(FFFutures Tbill3m), the difference between the federal funds Futures rate and federal funds target rate
(FFTarget  FFFutures), and the return of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (RVIX).44 See Hamilton (2008) and Bernanke and Kenneth (2005) for the rationales of these state variables.
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VaRi;t ¼ ðbai þ bgiMt1Þ. Based on a 1% quantile regression of Eq. (3), we calculate the time-varying
conditional risk as
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ 
hbajji þ bbjjiVaRi;tþ bgjjiMt1
i
: (4)
The conditional risk CoVaRj;tji;t can be decomposed into three components: region j’s speciﬁc risk
ðbajjiÞ, the risk originated from region i ðbbjjiVaRi;tÞ and the risk driven by common factors
ðbgjjiMt1Þ.5
To measure the degree towhich the market distress of region i contributes to the risk in region j, we
apply the risk contributionmeasure DCoVaRj;tji;t , which is deﬁned as the difference in the region j’s risk
conditional on region i being in distress (Ri,t ¼ VaRi,t), and conditional on region i being normal
ðRi;t ¼ VaR50%i;t Þ:
DCoVaRj;tji;t ¼ bbjji

VaRi;t  VaR50%i;t

;
where VaR50%i;t is calculated as the ﬁtted value from 50% quantile regression of Eq. (2). This way
DCoVaRj;tji;t captures the risk contribution of region i to region j or region j’s risk exposure to region i at
period t.
This approach can be directly applied to the regional aggregate return as well as to fund return. To
calculate the time-varying VaR for each equity fund, we replace the regional return in Eq. (2) with the
fund’s return and estimate the quantile regressions. Then, to calculate the risk contribution of fund k to
the region j, we replace the return of region i on the right hand side of Eq. (3) with the return of fund k
accordingly.
2.3. Data
Our analysis uses weekly fund-level data from Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR), which
reports total net assets (TNAs) under management and returns on net asset value (NAV). The aggregate
market return for each region is calculated as the TNA-weighted NAV return of all funds investing in
that region. The sample covers equity funds investing in both developed and emerging markets from
November 23, 2003, to June 8, 2011 (395 weeks). The data are screened using standard procedures
following Coval and Stafford (2007) and Jotikasthira et al. (2012): First, excluding funds with TNA less
than USD 5million throughout the sample period; second, dropping funds with ﬂows or returns falling
out of the range [50%, 200%]6; and third, keeping funds withmore than 30weeks of observations. The
ﬁnal sample includes 1,409,861 fund-weeks, covering 10,303 equity funds investing in the global
markets. The 10,303 funds are classiﬁed into 9 regional markets based on the fund’s geographic in-
vestment focus. The four categories that represent emerging markets are Asia ex-Japan (Asia hence-
forth); Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA); Latin America (LatAm); and the Global Emerging
Market (GEM).7 The other ﬁve categories represent developed markets are Japan; Paciﬁc; the US;
Western Europe (WE); and the global developed market (Globe).8 While GEM and Globe overlap each
other geographically, the equity funds identiﬁed in these two regions are not the same. In the sample,
the number of funds investing in their respective market for every week is greater than 30. The weekly
average observations in each market range from 59 to 793. The data used to construct state variables
(MSCI world index, 3-month and overnight LIBOR, federal fund target rate, CBOT’s federal funds futures
rate, and VIX) are obtained from Datastream and Bloomberg.5 See Wong and Fong (2011).
6 This step excludes newly-established funds whose data are relatively noisy. This step however drops a very small fraction of
total observations.
7 This classiﬁcation follows from EPFR, the mutual fund data provider. Funds in the GEM and Globe categories target the
broad emerging market and developed market respectively.
8 See Appendix Table 1 for country lists under each category.
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The static risk measure of conditional risk is reported in Fig. 1. The heatmap plots this measure of
market interdependence with the estimated static CoVaR in the off-diagonal cells and the VaR in the
diagonal cells, using a darker colour for higher risk. Speciﬁcally, for any js i, the value reported in row j
and column i is CoVaRjji, the static risk of region j conditional on region i being in market distress,
where j and i correspond to regions in S ¼ {Asia, EMEA, LatAm, GEM, Japan, Paciﬁc, US, WE, Globe}.
Additionally, each diagonal cell reports the unconditional risk VaRj, where j is the region speciﬁed in
the leftmost column. Note that the values in the diagonal cells are consistently smaller than any other
cells in the same row - this implies that the unconditional risk (VaRj) of region j is smaller than the risk
of this region conditional on the other region being in market distress ðCoVaRjjiÞ for any i ˛ S and is j.
The plots therefore tentatively suggest market interdependence across regions.
To compare developed and emerging markets, it is worth pointing out that the cells in the ﬁrst four
rows showing the conditional and unconditional risks of the four emerging markets are generally
darker than the other rows that represent the risk of developed markets. It suggests that emerging
markets are generally riskier than developed markets. Further, the risk of an emerging market, say j,
conditional on a developedmarket, say i, being in distress ðCoVaRjjiÞ is typically higher than the risk of a
developed market conditional on an emerging market being in distress ðCoVaRijjÞ. This however does
not mean that the response of emerging market to the risk from developed market is more sensitive
than the response of developed market to the risk from emerging market: CoVaR measures the level of
the conditional risk but not the marginal risk generated from the other market.
To account for the risk dynamics over time, we present the time-varying unconditional and con-
ditional risk measures. Shown in Table 1, the evidence on the market interdependence is quite robust
after accounting for the time-varying risk dynamics: the average conditional risk of a market (calcu-
lated as
PT
t¼1
Pi˛S
isjCoVaRj;tji;t=ð8TÞ) is found to be consistently higher than its average unconditional
risk ðPTt¼1VaRj;t=TÞ throughout the sample period for all of the nine markets.
Having documented the pairwise market interdependence among these markets, we next report
the risk exposure and risk contribution in the last two rows of Table 1. The average risk exposure ofFig. 1. Market interdependence based on static unconditional and conditional risk. The diagonal cells of the heatmap illustrate the
VaR of Asia ex-Japan (Asia); Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA); Latin America (LatAm); the Global Emerging Market (GEM);
Japan; Paciﬁc; the US; Western Europe (WE); and the global developed market (Globe). The off-diagonal cells report the CoVaR of
markets speciﬁed on the very left column conditional on the market speciﬁed on the top row being in distress.
Table 1
Summary statistics on unconditional and conditional risk. This table reports the average regional aggregate return Rj,t and
unconditional risk VaRj,t for each region j speciﬁed in the top row. The average risk of market j conditional on any of the other
region i being in distress is calculated as the average of market j’s conditional risks
PT
t¼1
Pi˛S
isjCoVaRj;tji;t=ð8TÞ. The average risk
exposure and risk contribution of region j is calculated as
PT
t¼ 1
Pi˛S
isjDCoVaRj;tji;t=ð8TÞ and
PT
t¼1
Pi˛S
isjDCoVaRi;tjj;t=ð8TÞ
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below the average statistics. All numbers are reported in percentage.
Asia EMEA LatAm GEM Japan Paciﬁc US WE Globe
Rj,t 0.33 0.37 0.54 0.24 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.18
(3.16) (3.74) (4.16) (3.16) (2.76) (2.83) (2.46) (2.29) (2.47)
VaRj,t 5.65 9.06 9.46 6.83 6.66 5.33 4.81 5.16 5.67
(2.83) (3.60) (2.49) (3.50) (1.54) (2.26) (1.90) (1.80) (1.34)
CoVaRj,tji,t 9.21 11.41 12.64 8.91 11.20 8.34 6.85 7.87 7.36
(3.46) (3.74) (4.27) (3.14) (2.99) (2.94) (2.18) (2.87) (2.47)
Risk exposure 5.81 6.99 7.71 5.93 6.41 5.74 3.75 5.00 5.00
(1.96) (2.45) (2.91) (2.00) (2.14) (2.15) (1.60) (2.08) (1.89)
Risk contribution 5.58 6.46 5.77 6.95 4.48 5.65 5.51 5.40 6.56
(2.74) (2.75) (1.96) (3.10) (1.96) (2.38) (2.17) (1.71) (1.67)
Notes on abbreviation: Asia: Asia ex-Japan; EMEA: Europe, the Middle East and Africa; LatAm: Latin America; GEM: the global
emerging market; WE: Western Europe; Globe: the global developed market.
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PT
t¼1
Pi˛S
isjDCoVaRj;tji;t=ð8TÞ, ranges from 3.75%
(j ¼ US) to 7.71% (j ¼ LatAm). The average risk exposure of US is the lowest while that of LatAm is the
highest suggesting that US is the least sensitive to the overall risk of the other markets while LatAm is
the most sensitive. The average risk contribution of market j to the other market, measured byPT
t¼1
Pi˛S
isjDCoVaRi;tjj;t=ð8TÞ, varies from 4.48% (j ¼ Japan) to 6.95% (j ¼ GEM): this suggests that, on
average, the risk contribution of Japan is the most inﬂuential to the rest of the global markets while the
risk contribution of GEM is the least inﬂuential. Note that the market that is more sensitive to the
external risk is not necessarily the market that has higher risk contribution. We observe that, for each
of the emerging markets, its average risk exposure to the other markets is typically larger than its
corresponding risk contribution to the other markets; for the developedmarkets, however, the average
risk exposure to the other markets is generally weaker than their corresponding risk contribution.
To gain further insight into the conditional risk measure, we decompose for each region j its average
conditional risk CoVaRj;tji;t into three components: the risk driven by common factors that affect all
markets, the region-speciﬁc risk and the spillover risk contributed by the other markets (see Eq. (4)).
The average proportion of CoVaRj;tji;t attributed to each source is presented in Fig. 2. The spillover risk
accounts for more than 50% of the average conditional risk. The proportion of conditional riskFig. 2. Components of CoVaR.
Y. Jinjarak, H. Zheng / Journal of International Money and Finance 46 (2014) 61–8168attributed to region-speciﬁc characters is small in EMEA (28%) and large in US (38%). The common
factors appear to be the least important: the proportion of the conditional risk driven by common
factors ranges from 5% in Japan to 14% in EMEA.
4. Granular origins
We have so far documented some evidence of market interdependence across markets. In this
section, we delve into the origins of market interdependence by looking at the micro characteristics of
equity funds. Given the large number of funds investing in the global market, according to the rule of
diversiﬁcation, an idiosyncratic (fund-speciﬁc) shock should have insigniﬁcant effect on the aggregate
market risk. However, this may not be the case for a market with a fat-tailed distribution of funds. In a
different analysis, Gabaix shows that a third of variations in the US output growth is explained by the
output shock to the largest 100 ﬁrms. In our paper, we are interested in the application of the granular
hypothesis in the global equity investment. Speciﬁcally, we test whether idiosyncratic shocks to large
funds have any economically signiﬁcant effect on the aggregate risk. If the granular view is applicable,
the idiosyncratic shocks could potentially contribute to the global market risk co-movements. More-
over, given the presence of global market interdependence documented in the previous section, the
idiosyncratic shocks to large funds in region j could contribute to the conditional risk of the other
region i accordingly.
We start the exploration into the granular hypothesis by checking whether the equity fund size
follows the power-law distribution. Fig. 3 plots the cumulative distribution of the average TNA and
aggregate volatility of large funds in our sample. Interestingly we ﬁnd that the size of largest funds (top
10%) and the aggregate volatility obey the power-law distribution, with the exponent coefﬁcient
approximately equals to1 and3. Shown in Table 2, the 10% largest funds account for 48–67% of TNA
across markets.
4.1. Deﬁnition of granular residuals
To test the granular hypothesis, we sort equity funds in eachmarket in ascending order according to
their TNA and examine the top 10% largest funds. For each large fund k investing in market i, we
calculate Varki;t , its unconditional risk at period t, based on Eq. (2). The average unconditional risk of
these funds investing in market i at period t is measured by
VaRi;t ¼
XKi;t
k¼1
VaRi;t

Ki;t ;
where Ki,t is the number of funds in the top size quintile inmarket i at period t. The granular residuals of
market i at period t, Gi,t, which is a measure of the idiosyncratic shocks to large funds in market i, isFig. 3. Cumulative distribution of the total net assets under management and the absolute value of the aggregate return of the top
10% largest funds in our sample.
Table 2
Size of the top 10% largest funds. This table reports the time-series average statistics and their standard deviations (s.d) for (i)
TNAi,t, the total net asset (TNA) under management (in million USD) for each regional market i speciﬁed in the top row; (ii)PKi;t
k¼1TNA
k
i;t1, the TNAmanaged by the top 10% largest funds in market i, where Ki,t is the number of the top 10% largest funds in
market i at period t and TNAki;t1 is the TNA of fund k investing in market i at period t; (iii)
PKi;t
k¼ 1TNA
k
i;t1=TNAi;t , the ratio of the
TNAmanaged by the top 10% largest funds to the TNA of thewhole market; (iv)
PKi;t
k¼1TNA
k
i;t1=Ki;t the average TNA of the top 10%
largest funds in market i; and (v) Ni,t, the total number of funds in market i.
Asia EMEA LatAm GEM Japan Paciﬁc US WE Globe
TNAi,t 119,024 32,398 27,729 163,621 40,133 16,289 1,204,877 219,990 484,008
s.d 69,339 15,138 18,980 91,725 15,662 6450 435,065 101,719 191,816PKi;t
k¼1TNA
k
i;t1 69,578 15,668 14,580 102,946 23,418 8148 731,398 120,204 319,592
s.d 44,601 7609 11,373 59,745 8785 3043 269,669 56,353 120,510PKi;t
k¼1TNA
k
i;t1=TNAi;t 0.558 0.481 0.477 0.636 0.587 0.517 0.606 0.545 0.669
s.d 0.056 0.033 0.090 0.051 0.031 0.074 0.024 0.024 0.029PKi;t
k¼1TNA
k
i;t1=Ki;t 2117 1420 2404 5607 1634 1650 5426 1963 4572
s.d 919 702 1366 1970 781 462 1635 724 1638
Ni,t 307 123 58 181 155 55 1375 609 731
s.d 101 49 23 55 28 16 323 198 212
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and the average unconditional risk of large funds VaRi;t:
Gi;t ¼
XKi;t
k¼1
TNAki;t1
TNAi;t1

VaRki;t  VaRi;t

;
where TNAki;t1 is the TNA of fund k that belongs to the top 10% largest funds in market i at period t  1,
and TNAi,t1 is the aggregate TNA of all funds investing in market i at period t 1. The granular residual
is essentially the sum of idiosyncratic shocks to large funds (measured by the standard deviation of
their unconditional risk), weighted by size. This application is derived from Gabaix (2011).
Firstly, we are interested in what fraction of the total variance of market aggregate risk can be
explained by the granular residual. If diversiﬁcation is at work, we expect the idiosyncratic shocks to
disappear at the aggregate level. To put this in perspective, consider a market with 10,000 funds of
identical size and identical standard deviation s. Then the standard deviation of the market is s/100.
If there is a 10% idiosyncratic shock to a single fund, the cumulative effect of such a shock on the
market is 0.1%, which is insigniﬁcant. However, in a world with large granular institutional investors,
we expect a nontrivial fraction of the aggregate market risk to be explained the granular residuals.
Yet, plausibly the risk of large funds could be inﬂuenced by the common aggregate market shock, i.e.
reverse causality, a possibility that we deal with using several robustness checks afterwards. Sec-
ondly, based on the estimates of granular residuals, we are also interested in the market interde-
pendence and the inﬂuence of large institutional investors on market externality in the global equity
markets.
4.2. Explanatory power of granular residuals
4.2.1. Common risk factors and granular residuals
By and large, common risks are understood to be important factors driving the global market
interdependence. To further examine the potential effects of granular residuals, we empirically mea-
sure their explanatory power on the global market interdependence together with the common risk
factors in the equity fund data.
We focus on three proxies of common risk factors widely monitored in the markets: the change of
investment sentiment (as measured by the return of VIX); the shock to market liquidity (as measured
by the return of the TED spread), the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month
US T-bill interest rate; and the change of the global market environment (as measured by the return of
the MSCI World Index).
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VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ AiXt þ ei;
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ AjjiXt þ ejji;
we estimate the explanatory power of these common risk factors on the aggregate market risk and the
global market interdependence. The left panel of Fig. 4 reports the adjusted R2 from the regression of
VaRi,t in the diagonal cell of column i and the adjusted R2 from the regression of CoVaRj;tji;t in the cell at
column i row j (j s i).
To examine the granular residuals, we estimate regressions of VaR and CoVaR on the granular re-
siduals and Xt:
VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ AiXt þ liGi;t þ ei;
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ AjjiXt þ ljjiGi;t þ ejji;
The right panel of Fig. 4 reports in the diagonal cells the adjusted R2 from the regressions of VaR and
in the off-diagonal cells the adjusted R2 from the regressions of CoVaR.
Comparing the two heatmaps in Fig. 4, we observe that most adjusted R2 in the right panel is higher
than the values in the left panel, emphasized darker shade on the right heatmap. On average, the
common risk factors explain 12% of the unconditional aggregate market risk measured by VaR and 13%
of the global market interdependence measured by CoVaR. The explanatory power has increased more
than double to 27% and 28% respectively with the granular residuals. In the following, we investigate
further into the effects of granular residuals as a new and inﬂuential source of ﬂuctuation in the
aggregate risk and the global market interdependence.
4.2.2. Granular origins of aggregate market risk
To estimate the effects of granular residuals on the aggregate market risk, we regress VaR on the
granular residuals, accounting for idiosyncratic shocks to the largest 10% funds in each region:
VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ liGi;t þ ei: (5)
The estimation results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The coefﬁcients of the granular residuals
are statistically signiﬁcant and positive across all markets (except for GEM and Paciﬁc). This means a 1%
increase of the granular residuals adds to the VaR of the US, Asia, EMEA, Globe,WE, LatAm and Japan by
26%, 11%, 9%, 4%, 3%, 3% and 2% respectively. The granular residuals explain a nontrivial amount of theFig. 4. The adjusted R2 with and without granular residuals. In the left panel, the diagonal cells report the adjusted R2 from the
regressions of VaR (of the market speciﬁed in the leftmost column) on three common factors, while the off-diagonal cells report the
adjusted R2 in the regressions of CoVaR (risk of the market speciﬁed in the leftmost column conditional on the market in the top row
being in distress) on three common factors. The right panel records the adjusted R2 from the regressions of VaR and CoVaR on
common factors and granular residuals.
Table 3
Explanatory power of the granular residuals. Panel A reports the estimation results from the regression of VaRi,t ¼ Ci þ liGi,t þ ei,
for eachmarket i speciﬁed in the ﬁrst row. Panel B summarizes the average response of the conditional risk of themarket speciﬁed
in the ﬁrst row to the granular residuals based on regressions of CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ ljjiGi;t þ ejji . For eachmarket j speciﬁed in the
ﬁrst row of panel B, the average coefﬁcient of Gi,t is calculated as
Pi˛S
isj
bljji=8. The t-statistics reported in the parenthesis is
calculated as the simple average of the t-statistics of the eight estimations. The other reported average statistics is calculated in
the same way. Panel C reports the average impact of the granular residuals of the market speciﬁed in the ﬁrst row on the other
market’s conditional risk based on regressions of CoVaRi;tjj;t ¼ Cijj þ lijjGj;t þ eijj . For each market j speciﬁed in the ﬁrst row of
panel C, the average coefﬁcient of Gj,t is calculated as
Pi˛S
isj
blijj=8. The other statistics presented are calculated in the same way.
Asia EMEA LatAm GEM Japan Paciﬁc US WE Globe
Panel A: Dependent variable ¼ VaRi,t
Gi,t 11.237*** 8.964*** 2.886*** 1.314*** 2.479*** 4.031*** 25.898*** 3.339*** 3.731***
(10.990) (10.889) (5.035) (2.752) (14.947) (7.729) (16.889) (3.197) (11.863)
Constant 4.269*** 8.077*** 9.039*** 6.996*** 6.503*** 5.794*** 5.272*** 5.152*** 5.785***
(24.136) (44.099) (60.869) (36.979) (103.404) (51.219) (67.698) (57.588) (98.769)
N 395 394 394 366 394 310 395 395 395
R2 0.235 0.232 0.061 0.020 0.363 0.162 0.421 0.025 0.264
Adj. R2 0.233 0.230 0.0583 0.0177 0.361 0.160 0.419 0.0229 0.262
Panel B: Dependent Variable ¼ CoVaRj,tji,t
Gi,t 9.227*** 9.580*** 11.867*** 10.077*** 9.171*** 9.215*** 2.019** 8.593*** 6.393***
(4.514) (4.211) (7.073) (6.208) (4.024) (6.478) (2.403) (5.610) (5.482)
Constant 9.180*** 11.169*** 12.261*** 8.563*** 11.187*** 8.111*** 6.660*** 8.381*** 7.883***
(46.561) (49.819) (67.363) (46.083) (56.193) (47.338) (48.327) (57.782) (61.233)
N 380 381 381 384 381 391 380 380 380
R2 0.177 0.208 0.245 0.213 0.189 0.199 0.177 0.206 0.249
Adj. R2 0.175 0.206 0.243 0.211 0.187 0.197 0.175 0.203 0.247
Panel C: Dependent Variable ¼ CoVaRi,tjj,t
Gj,t 14.330*** 7.775*** 4.153*** 1.057* 2.607*** 6.425*** 42.445*** 3.438** 7.992***
(12.325) (11.515) (8.118) (2.035) (9.406) (9.902) (16.112) (2.436) (12.819)
Constant 7.371*** 9.388*** 8.438*** 9.907*** 8.995*** 9.208*** 10.092*** 8.681*** 9.715***
(41.688) (62.421) (64.170) (50.126) (86.050) (65.411) (74.917) (59.415) (84.384)
N 395 394 394 366 394 310 395 395 395
R2 0.278 0.252 0.145 0.012 0.189 0.242 0.397 0.020 0.295
Adj. R2 0.276 0.250 0.143 0.009 0.187 0.239 0.395 0.018 0.293
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Additional lags of the granular residuals in the estimation increase the R2 even further.9 Our equity
funds data lend supportive evidence that idiosyncratic shocks to large funds signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
aggregate market risk ﬂuctuations, in addition to the common risk factors.
4.2.3. Granular origins of market interdependence
Next we study the explanatory power of the granular residuals on the market interdependence. For
each market j, we run a regression of CoVaRj;tji;t , market j’s risk conditional on market i (js i) being in
distress, on the granular residuals of market i:
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ ljjiGi;t þ ejji: (6)
We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of Gi,t is generally positive and signiﬁcant. To summarize the response of
one market’s conditional risk to the granular residuals of the other market, for eachmarket j, we report
estimation results by taking the average statistics from the eight regressions of CoVaRj;tji;t , where i is9 These results are not reported due to space constraint but available upon request.
Fig. 5. Coefﬁcients of the granular residuals. The diagonal cells report the coefﬁcient of the granular residual in the regressions of
VaR (of the market speciﬁed in the most left column) based on Eq. (5) while the off-diagonal cells report similar statistics in the
regressions of CoVaR (risk of the market speciﬁed in the leftmost column conditional on the market in the top row being in distress)
based on Eq. (6).
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regression of CoVaRj;tji;t is calculated as
Pi˛S
isj
bljji=8. As shown in Panel B of Table 3, we ﬁnd supportive
evidence that market-speciﬁc granular residuals have signiﬁcant impact on the other market’s con-
ditional risk. Speciﬁcally, the conditional risk of LatAm is augmented by 12% on average if the granular
residuals of other markets increase by 1%, the most sensitive response among the nine markets. The US
appears to be the least responsive to the granular residuals of the other markets – a 1% increase in the
granular residuals of a non-US market adds only 2% to the risk of US conditional on the other markets
being in distress.
To evaluate the average impact of one market’s granular residuals on the other market’s conditional
risk, Panel C of Table 3 summarizes the estimation results from another dimension. Speciﬁcally, it
reports the average coefﬁcient of Gj,t, as
Pi˛S
isj
blijj=8, based on the eight regressions of CoVaRi;tjj;t on Gj,t
for js i. The results in Panel C of Table 3 show that, on average, the granular residuals of the US is most
inﬂuential on the other market’s conditional risk. For example, a 1% increase in the granular residual of
the US adds about 42% to the risk of the other market conditional on US being in distress. In general, we
ﬁnd that a market’s granular residuals increase the other market’s conditional risk.10 Combining these
results with the size information for the top largest 10% funds presented in Table 2, there is no evidence
that the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to the granular institutional investors increases with the
average size or the proportion of the TNA under management.
4.2.4. A closer look at granular origins
In Fig. 5, we report in row j, column i the coefﬁcient of the granular residual in the regression of
CoVaRj;tji;t on Gi,t, for any j s i (see Eq. (6)). In the diagonal cells, we report the coefﬁcient of the
granular residual from the regression of VaRi,t on Gi,t, (see Eq. (5)). Hence, row j reﬂects the sensitivity of
market j’s risk to the granular residuals, while column i describes the impact of market i’s granular
residuals on themarket risk. The decomposition of granular residuals is incorporated into a heatmap of
9  9 matrix, with darker colour corresponding to higher coefﬁcient of the granular residuals.10 The granular residuals of GEM and Paciﬁc are found to mitigate the conditional risk of the other markets on average. This
may be driven by the rebalancing characteristics of funds investing in GEM and Paciﬁc, which tend to attract more ﬂows and
generate relative good performance during recent ﬁnancial crisis when investors are seeking safe heaven.
Fig. 6. The adjusted R2. The diagonal cells report the adjusted R2 from the regressions of VaR (of the market speciﬁed in the most left
column) based on Eq. (5), while the off-diagonal cells report similar statistics in the regressions of CoVaR (risk of the market
speciﬁed in the leftmost column conditional on the market in the top row being in distress) based on Eq. (6).
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residuals (no a single row is dominantly darker than the others). Yet the conditional risk of Asia appears
more responsive to the granular residuals of EMEA, LatAm and Globe; while the conditional risk of
LatAm responds more to the granular residuals of Asia, Japan and US: i.e. if the granular residuals of
Asia, Japan and US increase by 1% respectively, the conditional risk of LatAm increases by 29%, 10% and
52% respectively.
We also ﬁnd that the granular residuals of US are the most inﬂuential, not only on its own aggregate
risk, but also on the conditional risk of other markets. A 1% increase in the granular residuals of the US
is associated with 29% increment in the risk of Globe conditional on US being in distress. Conditional
risks across all other regions respond even more signiﬁcantly to the granular residuals of the US over
the sample period of our study. Evidently, the granular residuals due to the investment of large
institutional investors explain a nontrivial part of the ﬂuctuations of both aggregate market risk and
market interdependence.
We next look at the adjusted R2 from regressions (5) and (6). For any js i, the off-diagonal cell in
row j and column i reports the adjusted R2 from the regression of CoVaRj;tji;t on Gi,t (Eq. (6)), while the
diagonal cell in row i and column i records the adjusted R2 from the regression of VaRi,t on Gi,t (Eq. (5)).
These results are reported as a heatmap of 9  9 matrix in Fig. 6. The conditional risk of Asia is
explained by the granular residuals of EMEAwith an adjusted R2 of 42%, and that the conditional risks
of both LatAm and GEM are explained by the granular residuals of Asia, with the adjusted R2 being 47%
and 36% respectively. For all the other markets, their conditional risks are best explained by the
granular residuals of US. In addition, the granular residuals of GEM and WE have low explanatory
power on conditional risks of the other market, with the adjusted R2 below 5%. If the explanatory
power of Gi,t on CoVaRj;tji;t is driven by market interdependence, we would expect the adjusted R
2 in
row j and column i to be equal to the diagonal cell in column i for any for any j s i. Our results are
inconsistent with this possibility.1111 Further, we noted that the granular residuals of LatAm explain about 6% of the variation in its own unconditional aggregate
risk but 22% of Japan’s risk conditional on LatAm being in distress (see column ‘LatAm’ in Fig. 6). In this case, the explanatory
power of the granular residuals of LatAm on the conditional risk of Japan goes beyond the market interdependence. We also
noted that the granular residuals of Japan explain 36% of Japan’s aggregate market risk, which is higher than any adjusted R2 of
the same column. It suggests that the explanatory power of the granular residuals of Japan on the conditional risk of the other
market is operated through its market interdependence, but might potentially be offset by other factors.
Fig. 7. Smooth transition probabilities of global market liquidity based on the TED spread. The TED spread is calculated as the
difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month US T-bill interest rate.
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4.3.1. Crisis versus noncrisis
To test whether the granular origins of market interdependence varies over time, we split the
sample into noncrisis and crisis subsamples, based on the volatility of the global market liquidity
measured by the weekly TED spread (the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-
month US T-bill interest rate). Speciﬁcally, we estimate a 3-state (low, medium and high volatility)
2nd-order Markov-switching ARCH model on the weekly TED spread, following Hamilton and Susmel
(1994). Fig. 7 plots the smoothed conditional probabilities whether week t was in a low-volatility
state (solid line), medium-volatility state (dotted line) or high-volatility state (dashed line). It
shows that the market liquidity fell in the low-volatility state from 19 November 2003 to 25 April
2007, alternated between the medium- and high-volatility states from 2 May 2007 to 3 June 2009,
and return to the low-volatility state afterwards. Based on the transition probabilities, we mark the
medium- and high-volatility states as the crisis period: 2 May 2007 to 3 June 2009; and the other as
the noncrisis period.
For each market, we re-estimate Eqs. (5) and (6) using subsamples of noncrisis and crisis periods
respectively, and report the adjusted R2 in Fig. 8. Generally, cells in the heatmap of the crisis period are
darker than the corresponding cells for the noncrisis period, reﬂecting higher values of adjusted R2 for
the crisis subsample. The ﬁnding suggests that the explanatory power of granular residuals is higher in
the crisis period than in the noncrisis period. This is especially the case for the granular residuals in the
US: i.e. the granular residuals of US explains 3% of Asia’s market risk conditional on US being in distress
in the noncrisis period, but 56% in the crisis period.
Next, to see how the granular origins of market interdependence interact with the global ﬁnancial
crisis, we regress the conditional risk measures on the granular residuals, as well as an interaction term
of the granular residuals and the crisis dummy DCrisis, which equals 1 if week t fell into the crisis period:
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ C0jjiDCrisis þ ljjiGi;t þ l0jjiGi;tDCrisis þ ejji: (7)
Table 4 reports the average estimation results based on market j’s risk conditional on the other
markets being in distress. The coefﬁcients of the granular residuals appear to be insigniﬁcant across the
nine markets while the coefﬁcients of the interaction term are generally positive and signiﬁcant. It
suggests that the conditional risks of these markets are not highly responsive to the granular residuals
during noncrisis period but become much more sensitive in the crisis period.
Decomposing the coefﬁcients of the interaction term into a matrix of 9  9, as shown in Fig. 9, we
ﬁnd that the association is mainly driven by the heightened sensitivity of the conditional risk across
markets to the granular residuals of the US during the ﬁnancial crisis. Following 1% increase of the
granular residuals in the US, the risk of Japan conditional on US being in distress in the crisis period
Fig. 8. The adjusted R2 in noncrisis and crisis period. In the left panel, the diagonal cells report the adjusted R2 from the regressions
of VaR (of the market speciﬁed in the leftmost column) based on Eq. (5) using noncrisis subsample, while the off-diagonal cells
report similar statistics in the regressions of CoVaR (risk of the market speciﬁed in the leftmost column conditional on the market in
the top row being in distress) based on Eq. (6) using noncrisis subsample. The right panel reports the same statistics using the crisis
subsample.
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responsive to the granular residuals of Asia, EMEA, LatAm, Japan and Globe during the crisis.
4.3.2. Alternative measure of the granular residuals
We recalculate the granular residual using the 10 largest funds instead of the top 10% largest funds
in each market. Repeating the regressions of (5) and (6) using the crisis subsample, we ﬁnd the values
of adjusted R2 remain robust as illustrated in Fig. 10.
4.4. Predictive power of the granular residual
Lastly, we study the predictive power of the granular residuals on the aggregate market risk and the
global market interdependence. To proceed, we run regressions of VaRi,t and CoVaRj;tji;t on the granular
residuals:
VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ li;1Gi;t1 þ li;2Gi;t2 þ ei; (8)Table 4
Theroleof thegranular residuals innoncrisis andcrisisperiods. Foreachmarket j speciﬁedinthe toprow, this table reports theaverage
estimated coefﬁcients and their standard error from the regression of CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ C0jjiDCrisis þ ljjiGi;t þ l
0
jjiGi;tDCrisis þ ejji , for
anyand is j. Theaveragecoefﬁcientof thegranular residualsGi,t is calculatedas
Pi˛S
i˛S
bljji=8,while thatof the interaction termGi,tDCrisis
and the crisisdummyDCrisis are calculatedas
Pi˛S
isj
bl0jji=8 andPi˛SisjbC 0i;j=8. Theother statistics are calculatedas the simple average of the
eight regressions.
Asia EMEA LatAm GEM Japan Paciﬁc US WE Globe
Gi,t 0.248 0.456 0.338 0.044 0.605 0.066 0.789 0.316 0.254
0.442 0.087 0.245 0.178 0.330 0.643 1.187 0.473 0.569
Gi,tDCrisis 11.877 10.191 12.885 12.341 13.420 11.110 3.645 10.238 7.167
4.983 5.010 4.504 5.681 5.772 6.543 4.962 7.007 5.188
DCrisis 3.245 3.581 3.548 2.433 1.415 2.288 1.920 2.408 2.065
10.506 12.525 10.492 9.197 5.108 10.367 9.816 11.672 10.214
Constant 8.042 10.049 11.147 7.796 10.550 7.390 6.133 6.938 6.555
53.028 66.170 65.193 57.526 78.178 64.608 62.318 63.976 64.702
N 380 381 381 384 381 391 380 380 380
R2 0.475 0.547 0.551 0.503 0.385 0.485 0.498 0.548 0.521
Adj. R2 0.471 0.544 0.548 0.499 0.380 0.482 0.493 0.544 0.517
Fig. 9. Coefﬁcients of the interaction term of the granular residual and the crisis dummy. The diagonal cells report l0i from the
regression of VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ liGi;t þ l0iGi;tDCrisis þ ei , while the off-diagonal cells report l0jji from the regression of
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ C0jjiDCrisis þ ljjiGi;t þ l
0
jjiGi;tDCrisis þ ejji , where j corresponds to the market speciﬁed in the leftmost column and i
refers to the market speciﬁed in the top row.
Y. Jinjarak, H. Zheng / Journal of International Money and Finance 46 (2014) 61–8176CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ ljji;1Gi;t1 þ ljji;2Gi;t2 þ ejji: (9)The adjusted R2 from regressions (8) and (9) are reported in Fig. 11. The lagged granular residuals
have predictive power over the market risk ﬂuctuations, as shown by the adjusted R2. Notably, the
lagged granular residuals of Paciﬁc predict about 36% of the variance of LatAm’s risk conditional on
Paciﬁc being in distress. Conversely, the granular residuals of LatAm are associated with 21% of
variations in Paciﬁc. The predictive power of the granular residuals of GEM and WE is relativelyFig. 10. The adjusted R2 based on an alternative measure of the granular residual. The granular residual is calculated using the 10
largest funds instead of the 10% largest funds. Based on the crisis subsample, each diagonal cell (row i column i) reports the adjusted
R2 from the regression of VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ liGi;t þ ei , while each off-diagonal cell (row j column i) reports the adjusted R2 from the
regression of CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ ljjiGi;t þ ejji .
Fig. 11. The predictive power of the granular residuals. The diagonal cell in column i reports the adjusted R2 from the regression of
VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ li;1Gi;t1 þ li;2Gi;t2 þ ei , while the off-diagonal cell in row j and column i reports adjusted R2 from the regression of
CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ ljji;1Gi;t1 þ ljji;2Gi;t2 þ ejji .
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granular residuals are useful predictor of the aggregate market risk and the cross-market
interdependence.
4.5. The granular effect and asset diversiﬁcation
The granular residuals explain a nontrivial fraction of the ﬂuctuations in aggregate market risk
as well as cross market interdependence. The degree of explanatory power however changes across
markets and over time. There is some mild evidence that granular effect is stronger in less
diversiﬁed market. We observe that the most concentrated market, Globe, with 67% of its TNA
managed by the top 10% largest funds (see Table 2), turns out to have the highest average R2 in the
regression of CoVaR (Panel B of Table 3). To explore potential source of time variations in the
granular effect, we study the role of the power law distribution of fund size, a proxy of the asset
concentration with higher exponent corresponding to higher degree of concentration (see Naldi,
2003).
We ﬁrst analyze the distribution of the mutual funds. For each week, we estimate the power law
exponent, 2t, of the top 10% largest funds in our sample:
P

TNAit > x

wx2t :
As shown in Fig. 12, the power law exponent escalates before the ﬁnancial crisis and slide
persistently after the ﬁnancial crisis. The average value of 2t is 1.58 in the crisis period (the shaded
area in Fig. 12), compared to 1.51 in the noncrisis period. During the ﬁnancial crisis when market is
more concentrated, the explanatory power of the granular residual is larger (see Fig. 8). This
supports the argument that lower degree of diversiﬁcation is associated with stronger granular
effect.
5. Market interdependence and asset diversiﬁcation
We have earlier shown that emerging market tends to be riskier and more sensitive to risk trans-
mission than developed market (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). This section explores whether the asset
diversiﬁcation is driving such difference.
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Fig. 12. The time-varying power law exponent of the TNA of the top 10% largest funds. The power law exponent 2t is estimated every
week based on PðTNAi;t > xÞwx2t , with i being one of the top 10% largest funds.
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(2003). For each week t, the power law exponent is estimated based on PðTNAki;t > xÞwx2i;t for each
market i, where TNAki;t is the total net asset under management of fund k investing in market i at period
t. The summary statistics of the estimated power law exponents are presented in Table 5. It turns out
that exponents of emerging markets are generally higher than that of the developed markets, which
suggest less diversiﬁcation in emerging markets. To explore whether low degree of diversiﬁcation is
driving high risk and risk sensitivity, for each market, we run regressions of VaR and CoVaR on the
time-varying power-law exponents. The estimated coefﬁcients of the exponent are generally signiﬁ-
cant, with the value presented in Fig. 13. Except for exponents of GEM, Japan and Globe, where the
funds tend to play the role of rebalancing, the coefﬁcients of the exponents are generally positive. The
result provide evidence that lower diversiﬁcation is associated with higher aggregate market risk and
stronger sensitivity to the external risk.
6. Conclusion and discussion
This paper ﬁnds evidence in support of the granular hypothesis in the context of equity fund
investment. The idiosyncratic shocks to the granular institutional investors are found to explain a
reasonably large fraction of the volatility of the aggregate market risk and the global market risk
interdependence. Common risk factors, such as changes in global funding and market liquidity,
risk appetite, are nevertheless important driving forces of global market interdependence. They
however only account for 12% of the aggregate market risk ﬂuctuations and 13% of the variance in
global market risk interdependence. Including the granular residuals substantially increase these
two numbers to 27% and 28% respectively. It suggests that idiosyncratic shocks to granular
institutional investors could be an important and potentially major origin of the global market
interdependence. The explanatory power of granular institutional investors on aggregate market
risk and global market interdependence is signiﬁcantly stronger during the period of the global
ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–09. These results are robust after controlling for common risk factors andTable 5
Summary statistics of power law exponent. Each week t, the power law exponent is estimated based on PðTNAki;t > xÞwx2i;t for
each market i, where TNAki;t is the total net asset under management of fund k investing in market i at period t. This table reports
the summary statistics of the time-varying exponent for the nine markets.
Asia EMEA LatAm GEM Japan Paciﬁc US WE Globe
Mean 1.537 1.756 2.118 1.065 1.096 1.313 1.559 1.658 1.328
s.d 0.349 0.590 3.226 0.121 0.102 0.278 0.082 0.113 0.111
Min 1.243 1.266 0.805 0.799 0.871 0.815 1.400 1.461 0.578
Max 2.339 3.975 29.948 1.759 2.264 2.189 1.769 2.417 1.515
N 395 394 394 366 394 310 395 395 395
Fig. 13. The estimated coefﬁcients of power law exponent. The diagonal cell in column i reports the estimated coefﬁcient of the
exponent from the regression of VaRi,t ¼ Ci þ bi2i,t þ ei, while the off-diagonal cell in row j and column i reports adjusted R2 from the
regression of CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ bjji2i;t þ ejji .
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institutional investors.
This paper offers new evidence on ﬁnancial interdependencies in the crisis of the 2007–09, and
possible implications for understanding capital market instability. Idiosyncratic shocks to granular
institutional investors are found to generate economically signiﬁcant shocks to the aggregate market
risk and account for an important fraction of ﬂuctuations in global market interdependence. As pro-
vokingly discussed in the Economist (2013):“Central bankers should take note. . taking account of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks can help improve
economic forecasts. The models that determine economywide decisions - like those run by the
Federal Reserve. – might be improved by looking at how big ﬁrms are doing.”
The Economist, June 22nd, 2013.Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that market information derived from proper monitoring of insti-
tutional investors can help understand not only the aggregate market risk but also the cross-market
risk interdependence. This is especially true during periods of ﬁnancial calamity. We believe that
our ﬁndings are consistent with several channels of global risk transmission in the ﬁnancial markets. In
the context of our evidence, the transmission is possible through ﬁre sales by distress funds holding
common assets, market sentiment driven by fund ﬂows, and active portfolio management transmitting
shocks across markets, among others. The implication is that the market risk and volatility can also be
transmitted not only across national markets but also across different types of ﬁnancial institutions,
including banks, insurance ﬁrms, hedge funds, thereby justifying the importance of on-going debates
over ‘too-big-to-fail’ concern.
Subject to data availability, we would like to take on further analysis that crosscuts major ﬁnancial
investors and institutions in the future. As our results on equity investment were derived from a large
number of countries, they suggest that such granular-investor driven too-big-to-fail concerns may
apply globally. The distressful adjustment in the global capital markets in the aftermath of the crisis of
2007–2009, and the importance of granular effects recently brought to light in our study and else-
where, calls for more policy-oriented analyses that can help minimize negative risk transmission
across countries.
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Appendix Fig. 1. The adjusted R2 with 2 lags of granular residuals. The diagonal cell in column i reports the adjusted R2 from the
regression of VaRi;t ¼ Ci þ li;0Gi;t þ li;1Gi;t1 þ li;2Gi;t2 þ ei , while the off-diagonal cell in row j and column i reports adjusted R2
from the regression of CoVaRj;tji;t ¼ Cjji þ ljji;0Gi;t þ ljji;1Gi;t1 þ ljji;2Gi;t2 þ ejji .Appendix Table 1
Classiﬁcation of regional markets.
Region Descriptions Covering countries
Asia Asia ex-Japan China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
EMEA Europe, the Middle East and Africa Czech Republic, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait,
Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, Turkey, United Arab Emirate
LatAm Latin America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru
GEM Global Emerging Market All countries in Asia, EMEA and LatAm
Japan Japan Japan
Paciﬁc Paciﬁc Australia, New Zealand
US US US
WE Western Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
Globe Globe All countries in Japan, Paciﬁc, US and WEReferences
Adams, Z., Füss, R., Gropp, R., 2010. Modeling Spillover Effects Among Financial Institutions: a State-dependent Sensitivity
Value-at-risk (SDSVaR) Approach. European Business School Research Paper No. 10-12.
Adrian, T., Brunnermeier, M.K., 2011. CoVaR. FRB of New York Staff Report No. 348.
Bekaert, G., Hodrick, R.J., Zhang, X., 2012. Aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 47 (6), 1155–1185.
Bernanke, Ben S., Kuttner, Kenneth N., 2005. What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy? J. Finan. 60
(3), 1540–6261.
Blank, S., Buch, C.M., Neugebauer, K., 2009. Shocks at large banks and banking sector distress: the banking granular residual.
J. Financ. Stab. 5, 353–373.
Broner, F.A., Gaston Gelos, R., Reinhart, C.M., 2006. When in peril, retrench: testing the portfolio channel of contagion. J. Int.
Econ. 69, 203–230.
Buch, C.M., Neugebauer, K., 2011. Bank-speciﬁc shocks and the real economy. J. Bank. Finance 35, 2179–2187.
Calvo, G.A., Mendoza, E.G., 2000. Rational contagion and the globalization of securities markets. J. Int. Econ. 51, 79–113.
Claessens, S., Forbes, K., 2001. International Financial Contagion. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston.
Y. Jinjarak, H. Zheng / Journal of International Money and Finance 46 (2014) 61–81 81Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R.S., Helwege, J., 2010. Is Credit Event Risk Priced? Modeling Contagion via the Updating of Beliefs.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 15733.
Coval, J., Stafford, E., 2007. Asset ﬁre sales (and purchases) in equity markets. J. Financ. Econ. 86 (2), 479–512.
Engle, R.F., Manganelli, S., 2004. CAViaR: conditional autoregressive value at risk by regression quantiles. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 22,
367–381.
Forbes, K.J., Rigobon, R., 2002. No contagion, only interdependence: measuring stock market comovements. J. Finance 57, 2223–
2261.
Froot, K.A., O’Connell, P.G.J., Seasholes, M.S., 2001. The portfolio ﬂows of international investors. J. Financ. Econ. 59, 151–193.
Gabaix, X., 2011. The granular origins of aggregate ﬂuctuations. Econometrica 79, 733–772.
Gauthier, C., Lehar, A., Souissi, M., 2010. Macroprudential Capital Requirements and Systemic Risk. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract¼1663993.
Gelos, R.G., 2011. International Mutual Funds, Capital Flow Volatility, and Contagion – a Survey. IMF Working Papers, pp. 1–27.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1826545.
Giesecke, K., 2004. Correlated default with incomplete information. J. Bank. Finance 28, 1521–1545.
Giovanni, J.D., Levchenko, A.A., 2011. Country Size, International Trade, and Aggregate Fluctuations in Granular Economies.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 17335.
Hamilton, J.D., 2008. Understanding the TED Spread.
Hamilton, J.D., Susmel, R., 1994. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and changes in regime. J. Econ. 64, 307–333.
Huang, X., Zhou, H., Zhu, H., 2012. Assessing the systemic risk of a heterogeneous portfolio of banks during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. J. Financ. Stab. 8, 193–205.
Jinjarak, Y., Wongswan, J., Zheng, H., 2011. International fund investment and local market returns. J. Bank. Finance 35, 572–587.
Jinjarak, Y., Zheng, H., 2012. On the Systemic Risk of Mutual Funds. Unpublished Working Paper 2012. The Institute of Global
Economics and Finance, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Jotikasthira, C., Lundblad, C., Ramadorai, T., 2012. Asset ﬁre sales and purchases and the international transmission of funding
shocks. J. Finance 67, 2015–2050.
Koenker, R., Bassett, G., 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46 (1), 33–50.
Longin, F., Solnik, B., 2001. Extreme correlation of international equity markets. J. Finance 56, 649–676.
López-Espinosa, G., Moreno, A., Rubia, A., Valderrama, L., 2012. Short-termwholesale funding and systemic risk: a global CoVaR
approach. J. Bank. Finance 36, 3150–3162.
Naldi, M., 2003. Concentration indices and Zipf’s law. Econ. Lett. 78 (3), 329–334.
Raddatz, C., Schmukler, S.L., 2012. On the international transmission of shocks: micro-evidence from mutual fund portfolios.
J. Int. Econ. 88, 357–374.
Stein, J.C., 2009. Presidential address: sophisticated investors and market efﬁciency. J. Finance 64, 1517–1548.
Wong, A.Y.T., Fong, T.P.W., 2011. Analysing interconnectivity among economies. Emerg. Mark. Rev. 12, 432–434.
